Introduction
Some economists suggest that industrial policies 1 should be used in developing countries to circumvent market failures that hinder development. Others believe that industrial policies themselves hinder development because of government failures. Most of the evidence from the post-World War II era supports the latter view. 2 However, there are some East Asian countries, most notably South Korea and Taiwan, that have used industrial policies widely and that have developed extraordinarily fast. 3 There is no consensus, but it is plausible that industrial policies have contributed to these countries' extraordinary performance. 4 Two related questions therefore arise: There is also a large theoretical literature on industrial policies. Most 1 In line with most of the literature, we define industrial policies as selective government interventions targeted at certain industries or firms. Industrial policies can take the form of e.g. subsidies, tax concessions, soft loans, preferential procurement policies, import restrictions or export promotions. 2 Krueger (1995) reviews government interventions in developing countries after World War II and independence as well as the dismal effects these interventions generally had. For a good illustration of how government interventions can go wrong, see e.g. Killick's (1978) report on Ghana.
3 Japan is another well-known example of an East Asian country with extensive industrial policies and rapid growth. We focus primarily on South Korea and Taiwan because they still had similar income levels as most African countries around 1950 while Japan was already more than twice as rich (Maddison 1995) . 4 Appendix A provides a brief summary of the debate about the role played by industrial policies in the rapidly growing East Asian countries. theoretical contributions are however based on models that abstract from either market or government failures, which in general restricts the range of possible outcomes: If there are no market failures, industrial policies can by assumption not do much good, and if there are no government failures, industrial policies can by assumption not be mismanaged or misused. To our knowledge, the only contribution analyzing industrial policies in a setting with market and government failures is Ades and Di Tella (1997) showing that the direct positive effects of industrial policies on investment are substantially mitigated by an increase in corruption.
5 But since their model serves primarily to motivate their empirical analysis, it is kept fairly simple.
We attempt a further step towards an industrial policy model that allows for both market and government failures and that is sufficiently rich to answer the questions posed above.
Our industrial policy model builds on Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) . In their model, the profitability of various activities is uncertain and the social returns on discovering a profitable activity exceed private returns since other entrepreneurs can easily copy the entrepreneur who discovered that a certain activity is profitable in the given economy. As a result, too few entrepreneurs engage in the costly search for profitable activities under laissez-faire such that industrial policies targeted at entrepreneurs searching for profitable activities could potentially increase welfare and foster development. We introduce a public agency into a simplified version of the Hausmann-Rodrik model and equip this agency with an industrial policy instrument. Since "governments are not omniscient, selfless social guardians" (Krueger 1990 , p.11), as critics of industrial policies rightly claim, we assume that this public agency has limited information and that it does not only care about social welfare, but also about political motives which lead it to support entrepreneurs who are politically close rather than those who are more distant. This relates our model to the seminal contribution of Grossman and Helpman (1994) , which analyzes trade policies under the assumption that public authorities care about social welfare and about certain political motives. 5 Models with both market and government failures are not only scarce in the industrial policy literature, but much more generally. Notable exceptions include Laffont and Tirole (1991) , Gradstein (1993) , Banerjee (1997) , and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) . 6 Our results and those of Grossman and Helpman (1994) are independent of whether or not public authorities care about social welfare because they are partly benevolent or
The main findings from our industrial policy model are that if the public agency is poorly informed, industrial policies are ineffective or even harmful, but that this is not necessarily so if the public agency is highly politically motivated. Given a highly politically motivated public agency, industrial policies increase welfare and foster development if and only if the public agency has a small budget (or a relatively hostile attitude towards entrepreneurs). Politically motivated agencies are thus not a reason to abstain from industrial policies altogether, but a reason for an institutional setting that ensures that such policies are modest.
Several other findings help in understanding why industrial policies have been relatively successful in South Korea and Taiwan. First, we find that highly competent bureaucrats, as observed in these two countries, raise the effectiveness of industrial policies by increasing the support for projects that are expected to be profitable as well as the share of projects that are expected to be profitable and that turn out to be so. The reason for the former is that higher competence and better information make it more costly for the public agency -in terms of foregone welfare -to support close entrepreneurs with projects it expects to be unprofitable. Second, we find that industrial policies are more effective, the lower the variability in the entrepreneurs' distances from the public agency. The ethnic homogeneity in South Korea and also in Taiwan may thus have contributed to the success of these countries' industrial policies. We extend our model in two directions: First, we investigate what happens when the public agency can talk to entrepreneurs about their projects.
We find that communication enables the public agency to learn more about the different projects even if entrepreneurs with unprofitable projects can often convince the public agency that their projects are profitable. A benevolent public agency thus communicates with entrepreneurs, which raises the effectiveness of industrial policies, while a purely politically motivated public agency has no incentive to do so. Second, we investigate what happens when entrepreneurs can engage in costly rent seeking activities to come closer to the public agency. We find that rent seeking can lead to a socially superior allocation of the public agency's budget if this budget is small or if benebecause the probability of staying in office increases in social welfare.
fits from public support are low for entrepreneurs with unprofitable projects.
The former implies that the potential presence of rent seeking is yet another reason for ensuring that industrial policies are modest.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces and solves the baseline industrial policy model. Section 3 extends this model and allows the public agency to communicate with entrepreneurs. Section 4 allows for rent seeking. Results indicating why industrial policies may have been more successful in South Korea and Taiwan than elsewhere are directly discussed in these sections. The normative question about the optimal institutional setting is answered in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The Industrial Policy Model
This section presents the baseline model: Section 2.1 introduces the setting. Section 2.2 looks at the laissez-faire case and the industrial policy of a benevolent public agency. Section 2.3 solves the model for the more realistic case in which the public agency is at least partly politically motivated.
The Setting
There is an "industrial policy agency" (henceforth IPA) and a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs with mass one. Each entrepreneur is associated with one project that is new in the given economy. It is common knowledge that α ∈ (0, 1) projects are profitable. These projects lead to private returns with net present value π > 0 and to social returns with net present value Π ≥ π. The other 1−α projects are unprofitable and lead to zero private and social returns. Entrepreneurs and the IPA have imperfect information about each single project's profitability (see below), and an investment is required to discover whether or not a certain project is indeed profitable.
The uncertainty about the different projects' profitability and social returns that exceed private returns are the key features of the model of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) . They argue that it is highly uncertain which "modern-sector activities" are profitable in a given developing country and that the social returns to discovering that e.g. cutting flowers, producing soccer balls or programming software is profitable exceed the private returns because other entrepreneurs can easily copy the entrepreneur who discovered that such an activity is profitable (as there are no patents for an entrepreneur who discovered that such an activity is profitable in the given country).
Each entrepreneur can pay the investment costs to discover the profitability of her project herself. Alternatively, the investment can be financed by the IPA whose budget allows it to support at most Ω ∈ [0, 1] projects. The budget Ω is set by the government, which may be influenced by international donors. The investment costs to discover a project's profitability are c e if paid by the entrepreneur, and c g if paid by the IPA. c g could exceed c e because administration and surveillance may be costly or because industrial policy may require distortionary taxation, while c e could exceed c g because entrepreneurs may have to borrow capital at (excessively) high interest rates due to their projects' riskiness or due to capital market imperfections.
This possibility that the IPA can finance the investment costs to discover the profitability of the projects of some entrepreneurs is the industrial policy instrument available in our model. It is fairly general and therefore wellsuited for our analysis.
8 It corresponds to offering subsidies if no repayment is required, and to providing venture capital if entrepreneurs must repay the investment costs or parts of their private returns in case of success. 9 It is appropriate to investigate cross-country differences in the effectiveness of industrial policy with a model with a single policy instrument since "the differences between Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, on the one side, and most less successful industrializing countries, on the other side, are not to be found in the use of different policy instruments. The differences are to be found instead in different ways of using the same policy instruments" (Pack and Westphal 1986, p. 102-103).
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As mentioned earlier, entrepreneurs and the IPA have imperfect information about the different projects' profitability (before they invest to discover a project's true profitability). In particular, we assume that for each project the corresponding entrepreneur e and the IPA g receive either a good signal s π i or a bad signal s 0 i , where i = e, g. The conditional probability that a project is profitable given s
where q i ∈ (0, 1) measures the signals' quality. The higher q i , the more information signals contain. For simplicity, we assume p (s π i ) = p (π). Bayes' law and basic algebra then imply
p s
It remains to describe how industrial policy affects aggregate welfare and the IPA's utility. Given that no entrepreneur would invest in the absence of industrial policy, the aggregate welfare effect of industrial policy is
where the expected effect of supporting an entrepreneur is
and the effect of not supporting her is w 0 (s g ) = 0. 11 Since private returns π are included in the social returns Π and, hence, in the welfare calculation, W is independent of whether supported entrepreneurs with profitable projects must repay parts of the investment costs or of the private returns.
We assume that the IPA is generally influenced by welfare considerations as well as by political motives when deciding which entrepreneurs to support.
In particular, we assume that it maximizes its utility
where the utility from supporting an entrepreneur is
and the utility from not supporting her is u 0 = 0. The IPA's decision on whether to support the project of a certain entrepreneur thus depends not 11 If some entrepreneurs did invest in the absence of industrial policy and if entrepreneurs could make their investment decisions after the IPA, industrial policy would have an additional welfare effect by influencing the entrepreneurs' investment decisions (as those receiving no public support would update their beliefs that their projects are profitable).
only on the expected welfare effect w 1 (s g ), but also on the IPA's benevolence λ ∈ [0, 1] and the entrepreneur's political closeness to the IPA θ:
The higher λ, the more the IPA cares about social welfare and the less it cares about supporting close entrepreneurs. The higher θ, the closer an entrepreneur is to the IPA and therefore the more likely she is to receive public support (given λ < 1). For purely political motives, the IPA would like to support any entrepreneur with θ > 0. Political closeness θ is independent of the type of project and of the associated signals, and uniformly distributed
12 µ θ measures how friendly the IPA's attitude towards entrepreneurs is in general, and σ θ the variability in the entrepreneurs' political closenesses to the IPA.
To make the analysis interesting, we moreover assume
such that paying the costs to discover the type of a project can increase welfare, but that paying the total costs to discover the type of all projects must lower welfare. 
Laissez-Faire and Benevolent Industrial Policy
Entrepreneurs receiving bad signals s 0 e never invest because p (π|s 0 e ) π ≤ απ ≤ αΠ < c e . Equation (1) and condition (11) 
12 In section 4, entrepreneurs can engage in rent seeking to get closer to the IPA. Closeness θ may thus become endogenous and potentially dependent on the type of project. 13 We assume that entrepreneurs and the IPA never invest if they are indifferent. with λ = 1, increases welfare and fosters development given that there would be no investment under laissez-faire, i.e. given q e ≤ q ′ e . Equation (7) implies that the expected welfare effect of supporting an average project is E(w 1 ) = αΠ − c g , which is negative by assumption (10).
Equations (4) and (7) imply that the expected welfare effect of supporting a project for which the IPA has received a bad signal s 0 g is
which must be negative since p π|s 0 g ≤ α and E(w 1 ) < 0. That is, the expected welfare effect of supporting projects with s 0 g must be negative since even supporting an average project is in expectation welfare decreasing.
Equations (1) and (7) imply that the expected welfare effect of supporting a project for which the IPA has received a good signal s π g is
which is positive if and only if
Note that q Proposition 2 further implies that signals must be of higher quality, the higher the IPA's investment costs c g and the lower the share α of profitable projects and the social returns Π on these projects. Propositions 1 and 2 jointly imply that it is more likely that a benevolent IPA can increase welfare and foster development in a country that would not develop otherwise, the higher q g relative to q e , the higher Π relative to π and the lower c g relative to c e . Hence, a benevolent IPA may be able to increase welfare even if its signals s g are of considerably lower quality than the entrepreneurs' signals s e given that c g is substantially lower than c e or Π substantially higher than π.
Before discussing the more interesting case in which the IPA is at least partly politically motivated, we comment briefly on the relationship between benevolent industrial policy, welfare and development. Suppose there are two countries, A and B: Condition (12) is violated in A, but holds in B e.g. because of a higher share α of profitable projects. Given that condition (15) holds, a benevolent IPA can increase welfare in A, but perhaps not in B.
14 Welfare and aggregate investments may nevertheless be lower in A than in B e.g. because there are fewer profitable projects. This leads to Corollary 1 Countries that perform badly may optimally have more active industrial policy than countries that perform well.
A negative relationship between industrial policy and development therefore does not necessarily imply that industrial policy is lowering welfare and hindering development. Hence, this corollary warns that results from crosscountry regressions of, say, growth rates on (industrial) policy variables must be interpreted very cautiously.
We subsequently focus our discussion on the case in which market failures are sufficiently severe to retard development under laissez-faire, but in which industrial policy could potentially increase welfare and foster development.
That is, we assume that condition (15) holds while condition (12) does not hold.
Industrial Policy by a Politically Motivated Agency
In this section, we derive the industrial policy that maximizes the utility U of an IPA which is at least partly politically motivated. We further analyze how this industrial policy affects welfare W , and we discuss how our findings can help to explain why industrial policies have been relatively successful in South Korea and Taiwan while they have failed in many other developing countries.
Following on from discussing the case of a completely benevolent IPA, we 
Case 1: Binding budget
The budget Ω is binding when the IPA cannot support all the entrepreneurs it would like to support. 15 The IPA supports in this case those Ω entrepreneurs that yield the highest utility u 1 . To find out which entrepreneurs these are,
we first look at how the IPA would decide if it could only support one out of two entrepreneurs it would like to support.
If the IPA must decide between two entrepreneurs for which it has received the same signal, it supports the closer. Even though this may seem unfair, it does not affect welfare W as political closeness θ is independent of the 15 Condition (23) will state precisely when Ω is (not) binding. 
withλ ≡ λ/(1 − λ), where the equality follows from equations (13) and (14).
Given Ω < α, the closest Ω entrepreneurs with projects for which the IPA has received a good signal s π g are characterized by
It follows from conditions (16) and (17) that the IPA supports only projects
Since θ is uniformly distributed, the IPA uses financial resources exceeding Some results to which we will refer at the end of this section deserve a brief discussion: First, higher quality signals increase the support for projects with good signals s π g (relative to the support for projects with s 0 g ) since they make it more costly for the IPA -in terms of forgone welfare -to support close entrepreneurs with bad signals s 0 g . In addition, higher quality signals also 16 We assume that the IPA supports the closer entrepreneur if it is indifferent. 17 Subsequently, increasing and decreasing stand for monotonically increasing and monotonically decreasing, respectively. directly increase the support for profitable projects as the share of profitable projects with good signals increases. Second, an increase in the variability in the entrepreneurs' closenesses σ θ has the same effect as a decrease in the IPA's benevolence λ since it also increases the importance of political considerations for the IPA.
We next investigate how the industrial policy described affects welfare. If Ω < Ω ′ , the IPA behaves as if it were benevolent and supports only projects with good signals s π g . Hence, the aggregate welfare effect of industrial policy is
Since condition (15) guarantees that
and increasing in the IPA's budget Ω. It follows from equation (14) that
further increases in q g , α and Π while it decreases in c g .
If Ω ≥ Ω ′ , the IPA supports α ′ projects with s 
which can be positive or negative. Again, it increases in q g , α and Π, but decreases in c g . Since W (Ω ≥ Ω ′ ) also increases in Ω ′ , it is moreover increasing in λ and decreasing in σ θ . The welfare effect of a marginal increase in the IPA's budget Ω is
That is, welfare decreases in Ω if Ω ≥ Ω ′ since the support for projects with The hump-shaped relationship between W and Ω is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Proposition 4 implies that industrial policy increases welfare W even if the IPA is highly politically motivated given that the IPA's budget Ω is sufficiently small. 18 The reason is that if the IPA cares at least marginally about social welfare, it always prefers to support projects it expects to be profitable when having the choice between different projects of equally close entrepreneurs. Even a highly (but not entirely) politically motivated IPA supports therefore first projects it expects to be profitable such that industrial policy increases welfare whenever the budget Ω allows only supporting a few projects. Moreover, proposition 4 implies that the welfare-maximizing budget Ω ′ exceeds zero whenever λ > 0, and that it is the larger, the higher λ, q g , α and Π and the lower σ θ . We will come back to these results when presenting policy and institutional implications in section 5.
We next discuss how our baseline model can help in understanding why industrial policies have been successful in some countries, most notably South Korea and Taiwan, while they have failed elsewhere. We have firstly seen that it is impossible for public agencies with poor information to conduct welfare-increasing industrial policies. This is already sufficient to explain why industrial policies have failed in certain countries where public agencies are known to lack competence. the homogeneity within the Taiwanese population and the small differences between entrepreneurs from the island and the mainland. Industrial policies may thus have been relatively effective in these three countries because the ethnic homogeneity has lead to a low variability in the entrepreneurs' closenesses to the relevant public agencies and because this low variability has reduced the importance of political considerations for these agencies.
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We next illustrate that ethnic fractionalization may not only help to explain why industrial policies have succeeded in some countries, but also why the have failed in others. Evans (1995) analyzes industrial policies in Brazil, 19 For anecdotal evidence of South Korean public agencies far from benevolent see e.g. Ades and Di Tella (1997) . 20 The index of ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals of a certain country belong to different ethnic groups. 21 Similarly, it has been argued that social cohesion was important for enabling industrial policies to work in South Korea and Taiwan (e.g. Chang 1994 , and Rodrik 1995a). However, it is homogeneity in the entrepreneurs' distances from public agencies rather than low inequalities within the entire society that matters according to our model. 
For the IPA's budget not to be binding, it must therefore hold that
The aggregate welfare effect of industrial policy is 
It follows The hump-shaped relationship between W and µ θ is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Moreover, W again increases in λ, q g and Π while it decreases in c g .
Hence, a change in the IPA's attitude towards entrepreneurs µ θ when Ω is not binding has a very similar welfare effect W to that of a change in the IPA's budget Ω when this is binding. To avoid repetitions, we subsequently assume that Ω is binding, which requires Ω to be sufficiently small relative to µ θ . It can however be deduced how a change in µ θ would affect the results from how a change in Ω does.
Communication
In the previous section, we excluded -quite unrealistically -interactions between the IPA and entrepreneurs. We therefore present some extensions 
When the IPA tries to learn from entrepreneurs
We now extend our baseline industrial policy model and allow the IPA to talk to entrepreneurs about their projects before deciding which projects to support. We investigate under what conditions the IPA can learn from such talks, and we show with whom the IPA chooses to talk and whom it then chooses to support.
For the IPA, the potential benefit from talking to an entrepreneur about 23 Some of these studies, most notably Evans (1995) , argue that it is the simultaneity of intensive communication and state autonomy that matters.
her project is that it may learn what she knows about the profitability of her project, i.e. it may learn her signal. However, entrepreneurs try to mislead the IPA and to convince it that they have received a good signal s π e since this increases the probability of receiving public support. The signals that the IPA receives from talking to entrepreneurs may therefore be heavily biased.
We assume that each entrepreneur to whom the IPA talks can mislead the IPA with probability κ ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, the entrepreneur can convince the IPA that she has received a good signal s The proof is given in appendix B.
The reason why the IPA can in general learn from talking to an entrepreneur is that the interaction signal s eg contains some information whenever the entrepreneur cannot mislead the IPA with certainty (since q e > 0). This information then allows the IPA to update its beliefs about the corresponding project's profitability using Bayes' law. 26 We subsequently assume κ < 1 such that the IPA can learn from talking to entrepreneurs, and we investigate whether the IPA actually wants to talk to certain entrepreneurs about their projects and whether it finally supports mainly entrepreneurs it has talked to or mainly entrepreneurs it has not talked to. We assume that the IPA is willing to talk to an entrepreneur if it 24 Alternatively, one could assume that entrepreneurs with whom the IPA interacts succeed with probability κ in gaining the IPA's sympathy and that the IPA then treats these entrepreneurs as if they received good signals s accepts a small disutility ε → 0 for talking to her. We focus on the cases in which the IPA is entirely politically motivated (λ = 0) or benevolent (λ = 1), which is sufficient to grasp the main pattern.
An entirely politically motivated IPA is only interested in supporting the closest Ω entrepreneurs. Its decisions are therefore independent of its beliefs about the different projects' profitabilities. Hence, it is not willing to accept any disutility for more accurate beliefs and chooses not to talk to any entrepreneur about her project. In particular, we can distinguish the following five cases:
The IPA talks to all entrepreneurs with s π g and supports all those with s π eg .
2. p π|s π g , s 0 eg > c g /Π ≥ p π|s 0 g , s π eg : Given Ω < α, the IPA talks to all entrepreneurs with s π g and supports all those with s π eg and Ω − αp s π eg |s π g of those with s 0 eg . Given Ω ≥ α, the IPA directly supports all entrepreneurs with s π g .
p π|s
For Ω < α, see case 2. Given Ω ≥ α, the IPA talks to (Ω − α)/p s π eg |s 0 g entrepreneurs with s 0 g and supports all those with either s π g or s π eg .
4. p π|s 0 g , s π eg > c g /Π ≥ p π|s π g , s 0 eg : The IPA talks to all entrepreneurs with s π g and to Ω − αp s π eg |s π g /p s π eg |s 0 g entrepreneurs with s 0 g and supports 27 In a different setting with uncertainty about the entrepreneurs' political closenesses θ an entirely politically motivated IPA may talk to entrepreneurs to get more accurate beliefs about θ. We do however think that bureaucrats are in general well aware how close different entrepreneurs are. all those with s π eg . This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 7 An entirely politically motivated IPA never talks to an entrepreneur.
A benevolent IPA talks to entrepreneurs with good signals s π g and supports only entrepreneurs to whom it has talked (even when they often mislead it)
if Ω ≤ αp(s Hence, the intensive communication between public agencies and various entrepreneurs observed in South Korea and Taiwan and the fact that these entrepreneurs were more likely to receive public support than others does not necessarily imply that public agencies were highly politically motivated in these countries. According to our model, the opposite could be true; i.e. that public agencies were relatively benevolent and therefore talked to entrepreneurs to learn about their projects, and that they supported entrepreneurs to whom they talked to as these entrepreneurs were on average more likely to have profitable projects than other entrepreneurs. Because of the latter, it is moreover possible that the intensive communication with entrepreneurs improved the public agencies' budget allocation and contributed thereby substantially to the success of industrial policies in South Korea and Taiwan. (2) and (4) 
When the IPA shares its information
Condition (27) is less restrictive than condition (12) 28 The probability that this additional signal can induce investment increases in the signal's quality q g and depends crucially on the relationship between s g and s e . Put bluntly, the higher the correlation, the less likely it is that communication can induce some entrepreneurs to invest. Moreover, communication could not trigger any investment if s g were just a noisy version of s e , because no entrepreneur would then update her belief that her project is profitable. In addition, the IPA's announcements could hardly encourage some entrepreneurs to invest if entrepreneurs did not expect the IPA to tell the truth.
But even in the given setting, where signals are independent and where the IPA has no incentive to lie, active industrial policy (as discussed in section 3) is required to discover the profitability of some projects if q e ≤ q ′′ e . It is more likely that active industrial policy can increase welfare (q g > q ′ g ) while sharing information is not enough (q e ≤ q ′′ e ), the higher Π relative to π and the lower c g relative to c e .
Rent Seeking
In line with Krueger (1990, p. 11), we have already assumed in our baseline model that public agencies are not "selfless social guardians," but that they may act politically. It is often argued, again most prominently by Krueger (1974) herself, that politically motivated agencies are particularly harmful because they provoke corruption, lobbying and rent seeking. In this section, we analyze how such activities, which are henceforth just called rent seeking, affect industrial policy and its effectiveness. We therefore assume that the IPA is partly politically motivated, i.e. λ < 1, and that entrepreneurs can engage in rent seeking to get closer to the IPA and, consequently, to increase the likelihood of public support.
In particular, we assume that each entrepreneur's closeness is θ unless she pays the rent seeking costs r, which brings her closer to the IPA, to θ > θ. These rent seeking costs may either be financial costs, such as bribes, or some other disutilities associated with rent seeking. We further assume 28 The proof that p π|s 
The threshold r(s 
where Ψ(s
30
It is straightforward that p 1|s j g , θ ≥ p 1|s j g , θ for j = π, 0. Further, it follows from p s π g |π > 29 We assume that entrepreneurs never engage in rent seeking if they are indifferent. 30 This is shown in appendix C. 
where the equality follows from equations (3) and (5).
We Given Ω ∈ (α, 1), the IPA supports all entrepreneurs with s The possible presence of rent seeking is yet another reason for ensuring that industrial policies are modest because entrepreneurs with profitable projects are then more likely to engage in rent seeking than those with unprofitable projects, which, in turn, leads to a socially superior allocation of the IPA's budget. The same could alternatively be achieved by ensuring that benefits from public support are small (if not zero) for entrepreneurs with unprofitable projects. This however is probably more difficult to enforce than 35 One could e.g. make the IPA relatively independent (like many central banks) to reduce its exposure to strong political groups; this would however also reduce its accountability. Alternatively, one could link the IPA's future budget to its current performance, i.e. to the share of supported projects that are profitable. If this could be done credibly, the IPA would have a stronger incentive to support projects it expects to be profitable rather than projects of close entrepreneurs. In addition, one could introduce performance-linked wages for bureaucrats. a limited budget.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the government or the IPA could, under certain conditions, foster development without active interventions simply by sharing its knowledge. Since this passive policy requires no public investment into private projects, it is more difficult to misuse. It might therefore be a serious alternative to active industrial policies -given that it could indeed foster development -if public investment costs and the IPA's political motivation are relatively high.
Conclusions
We have presented an industrial policy model with both market and gov- should be aware that in reality modest industrial policies will be more likely to work than generous industrial policies. Notice that this implication is in stark contrast to the belief that successful development requires the government (or international donors) to finance a big push.
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Even though our model has proved helpful to get reasonable answers to the questions posed in the introduction, we are convinced that further research on the interactions between market and government failures is needed to improve our understanding of the possibilities and dangers associated with industrial policies. We think that our model could provide a good basis for this research. 37 But insofar as convincing governments and public agencies requires financial "incentives", these policy implications are partly conflicting. International donors must therefore act circumspectly to foster development in places where people are already suffering from both market failures and incompetent, highly politically motivated public authorities. 36 The idea that industrialization requires a big push goes back to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Murphy, Shleifer and Vishney (1989) and Rodrik (1996) provide relatively recent models on industrialization and the big push. However, contrary to what is often argued, these models do not imply that a big push requires public expenditures (Rodrik 2004 ).
37 Our model suggests that massive aid payments to support industrial policies should be harmful in most developing countries while modest aid payments might be effective. This is consistent with the (inconclusive) evidence of a hump-shaped relationship between foreign aid and growth (e.g. Hansen This view was challenged by a series of "revisionist" contributions in the late 1980s arguing that industrial policies were used in most fast growing East Asian countries to foster development. The best-known contributions are probably those of Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) . They provide an extensive account of various selective government interventions in South Korea and Taiwan, respectively. Further, they both argue that these interventions contributed substantially to these countries' extraordinary performance. 
Given κ < 1 (as well as q e > 0 and q g < 1), it must hold that p s 
Since s e contains no information about s g in addition to its information about the project's type, it holds for all i, j, k = π, 0 that p s .
Equations (2) to (5) 
